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1.　Introduction
On March 9, 1945 the period of joint Japanese‒French control, which had existed since 1940 under 
the Japanese military in Indochina, ended with the Japanese coup de force, bringing to a temporary 
close 80 years of French sovereignty. The purpose of this paper is to analyze how postwar France at-
tempted to reconcile its present with its contradictory past in order to re-establish control over Indo-
china by acknowledging the issues left behind by the Vichy regime established during World War II in 
Indochina and the Japanese‒French coexistence under that system and ultimately attempting to atone 
for them. Toward this end, I will focus on the two Japanese war crimes trials that involved France: the 
Tokyo Trials and the Saigon Trials. These trials were held to assign responsibility for the Asia-Pacific 
War by uncovering the truth; they also set the stage for both competition and co-operation among the 
Allied nations in establishing a postwar international order. The foremost goal of France in both the 
Tokyo and Saigon Trials was to pursue the issue of the Japanese invasion of Indochina. It is not possi-
ble to consider the French return to Indochina and the trial proceedings separately from the strategy 
for postwar colonial control. By tracing the history of French involvement in the trials and studying it 
in the context of postwar control of Indochina̶as France attempted to face its wartime past while si-
multaneously pursuing the issue of Japanese war responsibility̶it is possible to see how postwar 
French colonialism appeared throughout the country.
There is not a great deal of prior research on French involvement in the Japanese war crimes trials.1 
Even among the B- and C-class trials held for 49 Japanese-occupied territories, the Saigon Trials, in 
which France was the plaintiff, have not attracted much attention from historians. The reasons are like-
ly first that, unlike other Japanese territories, Indochina remained a French colony for the greater part 
 1 Scholarship on this topic includes Jean Esmein, “Le juge Henri Bernard au procès de Tokyo,” Vingtième siècle, 59, 1 (1998): 
3‒14; Yuichiro Oka, Tokyo Saiban: Furansujin hanji no muzairon [Tokyo Trials: The theory of innocence of the French judge] 
(Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 2012); Chizuru Namba, “La France face aux procès de Saigon et de Tokyo,” Outre-Mers, Revue d’his-
toire, nos. 380‒381 (2013): 313‒30; and Ann-Sophie Schopfel, “La voix des juges français dans les procès de Nuremberg et de 
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of the war, which made it more difficult to imagine France judging Japanese war crimes in the colony, 
and second, that the total number of trials (39) was comparatively small.
2.　Researching wartime Indochina
First, let us briefly discuss the situation in wartime Indochina.2 This area was unique in the sense 
that the Vichy regime exercised actual power during the war despite the military presence of the Japa-
nese. Even though Japan expelled the Western powers from other Southeast Asian colonies, in order to 
secure a stable base for the Pacific War, Japan chose to station itself in Indochina using the existing co-
lonial control mechanism, with a high level of co-operation from France. Even after the Vichy govern-
ment fell in the summer of 1944 in the Metropole, its officials maintained the administrative status quo 
until March 1945 in Indochina, since it was feared that a sudden change in government would provoke 
a Japanese takeover.
Facing the realities of French defeat, German occupation, the cutoff of maritime traffic with the 
mother country, and the Japanese occupation, the pro-Vichy colonial authorities under Gover-
nor-General Decoux intensively implemented the “National Revolution” under the slogan of “Work, 
Family, and Homeland,” aiming to strengthen control and unify the people through the glorification of 
Marshal Pétain. Also, since the most important goal was to stoutly defend sovereignty resisting and 
fending off Japanese attempts to undermine that sovereignty, they pursued policies of compromise, 
co-operation, and coexistence with Japan. The aims of France, which feared worsening relations with 
Japan, and Japan, which wanted co-operation from France from the beginning, coincided, so even 
while there was some anxiety in the relationship, Japan‒France joint control continued in relative 
peace for nearly five years.
With the change in conditions after the war, this choice taken by the French colonial authorities in 
Indochina was no longer deemed to have been the best action. To change the situation in Indochina, 
which had been under the Vichy regime for four-and-a-half years, a reborn France began an investiga-
tion to pursue the facts of the war. Officials and those in the military considered to be followers of Vi-
chy were sent back to France or were subject to épuration (political and administrative purging) in In-
dochina.3 The épuration of the French sent back to the Metropole was carried out by their respective 
 2 A detailed study of Indochina during World War II is in Chizuru Namba, Français et Japonais en Indochine (1940‒1945). Colo-
nisation, propagande et rivalité culturelle (Paris, Karthala, 2012).
 3 Frédéric Turpin, De Gaulle, les gaullistes et l’Indochine (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2005), pp. 129‒32.
Table 1.　Results of B- and C-class war crimes trials against Japan arranged by prosecuting country
US UK Australia Holland France The Philippines China
No. of trials  456 330 294  448  39  72 605
No. of people indicted 1453 978 949 1038 230 169 883
(Information excerpted from Hayashi Hiroshi, BC Kyu Senpan [BC Class war crimes trials] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2005), p. 61, 
table 2‒1)
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organizations. To conduct research into wartime Indochina across government ministries, however, 
the Commission Interministérielle d’Enquête sur l’Indochine (henceforth “the Commission”) was estab-
lished in Paris by the Ministry of the Colonies in October 1945. It consisted of personnel from multi-
ple ministries and agencies, including the Ministries of Colonies, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. From 
November of that year to 1947 and beyond, a large number of French repatriated from Indochina, 
from soldiers to high officials of the colonial authorities to lower-ranking administrators, and many 
others, were summoned and questioned by the Commission. An analysis of its records reveals what 
types of attitudes and behaviors were pursued, as well as what were recognized as issues in postwar 
France. The issues rigidly pursued by the Commission can be largely divided into three categories: the 
implementation of the National Revolution, collaboration with Japan, and the crackdown on the 
Gaullists.
First, the Commission inquired into the intensive development of the integralist ideology, the Na-
tional Revolution in Indochina and the creation of a Pétain personality cult. The enactment of these 
policies among the local populace, not just the French colons, was particularly criticized. One of the 
main policies was large-scale sports and youth activities targeting young people. The director of these 
activities, Maurice Ducoroy, was severely denounced by the Commission.4 Ducoroy responded to the 
Commission’s accusations that he had planted the seeds of “blind adherence” to the Vichy regime and 
Marshal Pétain among youth by claiming that it was a necessary measure to insulate them from the 
powerful propaganda of the Japanese. The Commission rejected this explanation, claiming that the 
Japanese did not actually have staff exclusively dedicated to organizing youth activities. Also, they of-
fered the criticism that by “setting up an environment that provided physical activity and instructors” 
through youth activities, Ducoroy had actually contributed to nationalist activities among young peo-
ple.
Regarding collaboration with the Japanese, the Commission took into consideration not only the 
various kinds of accommodation that the colonial authorities had publically reached with the Japanese 
military, but even individual contacts with Japanese. The French who were questioned explained that 
contact with the Japanese was of a compulsory nature and a mere formality, and that due to language 
issues, it was actually difficult to communicate one’s intentions.5 There were also those who empha-
sized their own anti-Japanese stance by underscoring their resistance to the demands of the Japanese 
and the fact that they had been abused in concentration camps after the March 1945 coup de force.6
Even in the interrogation of Marcel Robbe, the highest official responsible for propaganda in Indo-
china (Service de l’Information, de la Presse et de la Propagande, IPP), the compromise and co-opera-
tion he extended to the Japanese became an issue. The Commission criticized the fact that an article 
provided by the Japanese which was critical of the Allies was published in an Indochinese newspaper. 
 4 AN (Archives Nationales, Paris), MI43/1. Commission du 13 décembre 1945 pour entendre Ducoroy, Capitaine de Vaisseau.
 5 AN, MI43/1. Audition du Cdt. Postal, undated.
 6 AN, MI 43/1. Audition de Grandjean, Résident Supérieur au Tonkin, 18 avril 1946.
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Robbe justified his actions by claiming that he frequently engaged in heated debates with the Japanese 
concerning propaganda, that he had been arrested by the Japanese military police, and that he merely 
accommodated the Japanese so as “to not allow Indochina to disappear.” Tillard, the director of the 
Annam branch of the IPP, also justified his actions to the Commission by stating “We were under the 
control of the Japanese. We would probably have been treated badly had we not said that de Gaulle was 
a traitor and Churchill a scoundrel. These expressions were a means to free ourselves to some extent 
from the eyes of the Japanese.”7
The Commission also brought up the issue of the oppression of the local population. Of particular 
concern was the co-operation of the French and Japanese authorities in suppressing independence 
movements. In September 1942, the Japanese military handed a Vietnamese activist over to the French 
authorities, who executed him. This was recognized as a loathsome act symbolizing the joint Japanese‒
French control of Indochina, which oppressed the local people, and those responsible were extensively 
probed.8
One more act denounced by the Commission was the crackdown on Gaullists under the Vichy re-
gime in Indochina. Vigorous activity among the Gaullists in the colony was not seen until the collapse 
of the Vichy government in France in the summer of 1944. One reason for this was the crackdown by 
the colonial authorities on Gaullists to prevent a division between those French who supported the Vi-
chy regime and those who supported de Gaulle, as well as due to the fact that the authorities feared a 
deterioration of relations with Japan. The Commission attempted to get to the facts behind the use of 
monetary rewards to encourage informing on Gaullists. However, the questioning only yielded vague 
replies, and they revealed their irritation by stating that “Gaullists were certainly arrested, and some 
were killed or forced to do labor. But the person responsible is nowhere to be found. It’s as if it hap-
pened naturally.”9
For the Commission, the oppression of the Gaullists was not the only problem; the inactivity of the 
resistance was another issue. Here, resistance means not just acts directed at the Vichy regime, but also 
those targeting the Japanese. When the Frenchmen from Indochina were questioned over their partici-
pation in the Resistance, they gave vague answers, which the Commission harshly criticized saying, 
“Nowadays, all of those demanding resistance medals [in Indochina] are saying they began contact 
with the Resistance in September of 1944, but this isn’t something to be proud of. They should have 
done this in 1940, but there was no one back then.”10
In this manner, the Commission pursued and condemned the attitudes and behaviors of the French 
in Indochina during the war. Just as collaborators with the Germans and the Vichy regime were con-
demned in France right after the war and an accounting against former members of the regime was 
 7 AN, MI43/3. Audition de Tillard, Chef du Service de Renseignements en Annam, 29 septembre 1947.
 8 AN, MI43/1. Audition du Commandant Jouan, Commissaire Adjoint aux Relations Franco‒Japonaises, 28 mars 1946.
 9 AN, MI43/3. Audition de Debord, Chef du Service Central de Renseignements du Gouvernement Général.
10 AN, MI43/3. Audition de Parisot, Inspecteur Général, 10 juillet 1947.
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swiftly rendered, the new French government could not overlook the fact that the Vichy regime had 
held political power in Indochina during the war and coexisted with Japan.
3.　France and the Saigon Trials
I have clarified above how the postwar French authorities viewed the wartime situation in Indochi-
na. Based on this understanding, let us take a look at how the negative facts that became an issue for 
the Commission came out and were resolved in the process of the Japanese war crimes trials in which 
France was involved.
In order for France as the plaintiff to judge the war crimes committed by the Japanese during the 
war in Indochina, the Saigon Trials, which were BC-class war crimes trials, were held in Saigon from 
October 1946 to March 1950. To judge the war crimes of the Axis nations, in October 1943 it had been 
decided to establish a United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) with the participation of 
17 governments, including the French Committee of National Liberation. In March 1945, the 
UNWCC made the first list of Japanese war crimes suspects, and encouraged relevant countries to 
work towards capturing the suspects on the list. Within the French government, in January 1945 the 
Ministries of Justice and the Colonies co-operated in proposing the organization of war crimes investi-
gations.11 However, with traffic between Indochina and metropolitan France still mostly cut off, and 
with the Japanese military occupation and the pro-Vichy Decoux regime still in place, it was difficult 
to find out the details of war crimes in Indochina. Although a letter from the War Crimes Investigation 
Bureau in France to the Ministry of the Colonies dated January 9, 1945 stated that “it is very likely that 
Japan committed war crimes in Indochina,”12 in actuality almost all of the war crimes judged in the 
Saigon Trials were committed during and after the Japanese coup de force.
Although Japanese control of Indochina came to an end with the Japanese defeat in August 1945, 
France did not immediately resume control of the area. This was because British troops were stationed 
to the South of the 16th parallel and Guomindang Chinese to the North to disarm the Japanese mili-
tary. Both the UK and China then began to separately investigate Japanese war crimes in Indochina. 
While both countries were proceeding along those lines, France clearly recognized the need to per-
form this task by itself. The Asia‒Oceania bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “the 
French trial and sentencing of Japanese who committed war crimes in Indochina will certainly have a 
beneficial effect (effet salutaire) for the people of Indochina.”13 Documents from the Indochina Bureau 
of the Ministry of the Colonies stated, “this issue is important to our authority in the Far East, and we 
need to urgently hold a meeting with representatives from relevant ministries to find an effective 
11 AN, BB30/1791. Lettre du Colonel Chauveau, Directeur de Service de Recherche des Crimes de Guerre Ennemie, au Direc-
teur de l’Indochine, Ministère des Colonies, 9 janvier 1945.
12 Ibid.
13 MAE (Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, La Courneuve), Asie Océanie, Généralités 161. Direction d’Asie Océanie, Note pour 
le Secrétariat des Conférences, 24 septembre 1945.
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means as soon as possible.”14
However, due to insufficient naval strength, it was not possible to dispatch a military force of ade-
quate size to Indochina, and the timing for taking back official sovereignty from the British and Chi-
nese forces was still not certain. At this point, the right of France to judge Japanese war crimes by itself 
was still not self-evident. Even among the Japanese military who were being put on trial, the general 
view was that France did not have the authority to judge war crimes. One very real problem was that it 
would not be easy for France to actually engage in war crimes investigations in Indochina due to the 
colony’s distance from the Metropole as well as insufficient human resources and information. The 
War Crimes Investigation Bureau was established under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice in 
France to closely examine the war crimes of enemy nations during World War II, but their main mis-
sion was the pursuit of war crimes committed by Axis nations against French people in Europe, and 
this could not extend to investigating Japanese war crimes in the colonies of the Far East. The Director 
of the War Crimes Investigation Bureau claimed that this issue exceeded his own jurisdiction, and that 
the Ministry of the Colonies and the Direction Générale des Études et Recherches (DGER), an informa-
tion organization established by de Gaulle during the war, should have authority rather than the Min-
istry of Justice, and also that it was appropriate for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take the initiative 
concerning participation in international trials.15
In November 1945, representatives from each ministry held a meeting concerning the investigation 
of war crimes. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Colonies claimed that neither of them had a suffi-
cient number of suitable staff in their respective organizations, but eventually it was decided that the 
latter Ministry would take the initiative in establishing a war crimes investigation authority in Indochi-
na. Groundwork for establishing such an authority was laid by Admiral Thierry d’Argenlieu, dis-
patched as High Commissioner for Indochina (a new position replacing the former Governor-Gener-
alship), taking onsite command of mainly DGER members and gradually collecting information.16 The 
responsibility for governing southern Indochina was transferred to France from the British in January 
1946. On January 24, the Ministry of the Colonies in France told d’Argenlieu that “France at last has 
the right to bring legal action against war crimes” and that it was urgent to prepare a list of Japanese 
war criminals and hand it over to the United States “to show [French] intent to participate in having an 
important influence on the international stage.”17
By April, both the British and Chinese militaries had withdrawn from Indochina. For France, which 
was able to re-establish its authority in some parts of the colony (except for areas under the direct con-
14 ANOM (Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence), INF 1364. Direction de l’Indochine du Ministère des Colonies, 
Note pour le Secrétaire Général du Comité de l’Indochine, Paris, 30 octobre 1945.
15 ANOM, INF 1364. Lettre du Directeur de Recherche des Crimes de Guerre au Directeur du Comité de l’Indochine, 24 novem-
bre 1945.
16 MAE, Asie Océanie, Généralités 161. Direction des Affaires Politiques, Direction de l’Indochine, Note pour le Secrétaire 
Général du Comité Interministériel de l’Indochine, 30 octobre 1945.
17 ANOM, AFFPOL 3438. Télégramme du Ministre des Colonies, de Langlade, à destination du Haut Commissaire de l’Indo-
chine, 24 janvier 1946.
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trol of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam established in August 1945), it became possible to actually 
begin investigations into war crimes from late March. By June 1946, 933 Japanese war crimes suspects 
had been identified in Indochina.18 In the south, identification and questioning of suspects were car-
ried out with the co-operation of the British military,19 but with the Chinese forces more opposed to 
the French return and with the DRV holding power in the northern half of Vietnam, the French could 
not begin investigations, and of the war crimes suspects, 400 returned to Japan.20 Also, when the Chi-
nese troops ultimately left, they transferred about 160 Japanese detainees back to China to stand trial 
in Guangdong. France demanded that the Chinese return these Japanese prisoners, but even with ne-
gotiations, China refused to do so. The reason for this refusal was that they themselves had occupied 
Indochina by the decision of the Allies (taken at the Potsdam Conference) and considered that the is-
sue of Japanese war crimes should be resolved exclusively by the Allied authorities.21 In other words, 
China did not see France as one of the Allied nations and did not recognize the French right to hold 
trials of Japanese war criminals. France persisted regarding the handover of war criminals from China. 
When China eventually decided to send all but 15 of the Japanese from Guangdong back to Japan, 
France vehemently protested and strongly demanded the rendition of the confirmed and important 
Japanese war criminals. Eventually only five of them were returned to Indochina, with the remaining 
suspects repatriated to Japan.22 France, did not give up, however, and with the co-operation of the 
United States forces in Japan, they later succeeded in having 52 people returned to Indochina.23
The Saigon Trials began in October 1946. Now, an overview will be presented of the trials in their 
entirety. To start with, the focus of almost all 39 was on incidents that took place from the Japanese 
coup de force of March 9, 1945 until the surrender on August 15. The war crimes that were tried can 
broadly be divided into three categories.24 The first was the brutalities that occurred during the fight-
ing associated with the seizure of power. The massacre of the surrendered French soldiers and prison-
ers that took place amidst fighting with the French-Indochinese forces beginning from the evening of 
March 9th were the focus of these trials. The second category involved accusations concerning the poor 
environment of the prisons and the treatment of the French confined there: failure to provide appro-
priate aid to the sick and wounded, abuses, forced labor, and poor food and sanitary conditions. The 
imprisonment of French in the same cells as local people who were common criminals was also con-
demned as a significant disparagement of French authority.
18 AN, BB30/1791. Lettre du Commissaire Fédéral à la Justice au Garde des Sceaux, 13 juin 1946,
19 Journal de Saigon, 9 mai 1946.
20 Document cited in note 19.
21 ANOM, INF 1364. Lettre de J. Meyrier, Ambassadeur de France en Chine au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Direction 
d’Asie Océanie, 5 février 1947.
22 ANOM, AFFPOL 3438. Lettre de J. Meyrier, Ambassadeur de France en Chine au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 16 janvier 
1948.
23 MAE, Asie, Indochine, 130. Note sur l’arrestation et envoi en Indochine de criminel de guerre japonais, mission française au 
Japon, 21 février 1947.
24 Kokuritsu Kobunshokan (National Archives, Tokyo), Saigon Saiban Shiryo [Saigon Trials Documentation], vols. 1 to 39.
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The third and largest issue was the illegal confinement of French prisoners for the purpose of ex-
tracting information on anti-Japanese resistance activities and Allied forces through torture. The Japa-
nese military suspected that the French, who had contact with the Allies, were feeding information to 
them. The Japanese tortured some French prisoners in an attempt to obtain information. The trials 
also focused on incidents of massacre, torture, and abuse against French who displayed an attitude of 
resistance or made anti-Japanese proclamations. Violence against the French co-operating with the Al-
lies in resistance to Japan was therefore the main element of the Saigon Trials. In the end, these trials 
provided the means to highlight Gaullist activities, anti-Japanese resistance, and co-operation with the 
Allies.
Most of the war crimes heard at the Saigon Trials were those in which the victims were French. Un-
like the trials in the Philippines and also the BC-class trials conducted by the British, in which damage 
to local people was the cause of much legal action, a key characteristic of the Saigon Trials was that the 
focus was only on damage to Europeans and Americans. The French authorities encouraged Vietnam-
ese people to offer information on Japanese war crimes. One notice explained what war crimes were 
and said “People of Indochina̶if you desire the pursuit of justice, work to find war criminals.”25 How-
ever, the damage inflicted on the people of Indochina was hardly addressed at all in the Saigon Trials.
The reason for this was that much of the Japanese abuse of the local populace had targeted Vietnam-
ese communists. They were enemies of the French as well, as they were opposed to colonial rule, and 
also were subject to oppression from the authorities. From the coup de force until the Japanese defeat, 
the Việt Minh rejected not only French but also Japanese control. The Japanese cracked down on the 
group, which was conducting underground activities for independence. It is unlikely that the Vietnam-
ese themselves accused the Japanese of atrocities in the trials organized by the French, who returned to 
retake control. One Japanese man reflected that although he was involved in the arrest of about 100 
Vietnamese communists during the war, he was “fortunate” that the Vietnamese did not take any legal 
action regarding the war crimes.26 Nor was it possible for the French to actively judge these crimes by 
the Japanese military in a courtroom context. Since the French had also suppressed the Vietnamese 
communists, including executing some of the Vietnamese activists handed over by the Japanese, bring-
ing to light Japanese oppression of the local people ran the risk of the French exposing their own dark 
side.
It was therefore impossible to judge the Japanese abuses of local people, and the lack of any attempt 
to do so showed the limits of the Saigon Trials. The great cause of pursuing war crimes committed 
against all of the people “under the protection of the French Republic” became vague due to the exis-
tence of the Việt Minh as a shared enemy of the Japanese and French, the complicated situation of 
Japanese‒French coexistence for most of the war, and the beginning of the First Indochina War. Rath-
er, the purpose of these trials can be said to have been an attempt to regain French authority lost to the 
25 ANOM, INF 1180. Undated announcement “Les criminels de guerre japonais seront châtiés.”
26 Saigon Saiban Shiryo, vol. 28.
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Japanese by formally trying the Japanese in a courtroom, or an endeavor to destroy Japanese authority, 
which had likely increased during the French absence between March and August 1945.
4.　French strategy in the Tokyo Trials
In the Tokyo Trials, in which 11 nations jointly tried A-class war criminals̶those who guided the 
war and committed crimes against peace̶France’s main role was to attest to and prosecute the Japa-
nese occupation of Indochina. Individual atrocities tried at the Saigon Trials were sometimes referred 
to at the Tokyo Trials as detailed evidence attesting to the Japanese invasion of Indochina.
The judge and prosecutor whom France sent to Tokyo were not easy to select. At that time, there 
were not many legal scholars with a good command of English who were well-versed in the situation 
in the Far East. The selection process was difficult, with decisions still not finalized by the end of Janu-
ary, when many representatives from other participating nations had already left for Japan. After many 
twists and turns, Robert Oneto was chosen as prosecutor and Henri Bernard as judge. Neither of them 
was proficient in English, so an English instructor was sent as the prosecutor’s assistant to work with 
them. A letter back to France from Oneto reported that after arrival, the French delegation attended a 
banquet with General MacArthur, who mentioned the Resistance in France during the war and 
praised their leadership.27 It is therefore likely that the French delegation was strongly aware of the im-
portance attributed to the Resistance in the relationship with the Allied nations.
The International Prosecution Section (IPS) was established to prepare the trials, consisting of the 
prosecutors of each nation, who were basically responsible for proving that war crimes had been com-
mitted against their respective nations. Accordingly, the duty of prosecutor Oneto, representing 
France, was to note in the charges the Japanese invasion of Indochina, as well as their war crimes. In 
the lead-up to the testimony stage of the trial, the IPS held a prosecution committee meeting to work 
on such matters as the selection of defendants. Since Oneto’s arrival had been delayed, he was unable 
to attend the initial meetings.28 In the discussions of the IPS before he took up his duties, France was 
not recognized as a victim of Japanese invasion, although it was considered a target of Japanese war 
planning and preparation. According to Oneto, France was actually positioned implicitly as an accom-
plice to Japan, similar to Germany, Italy, and Thailand. This was of course because during the war Vi-
chy France had been allied with Germany, and it was precisely for that reason that the Japanese mili-
tary presence in Indochina had not involved an overthrow of the French regime until the final months 
of the war, unlike all of the other Western colonies in Southeast Asia. The French representative re-
sponded to this situation by stating that “such claims are absolutely unacceptable” and “we were not 
given sufficient time, we cannot quickly obtain opinions and direction from our home country, and we 
27 MAE, Asie Océanie, Généralités 162. Lettre du procureur français près le Tribunal Militaire International des Crimes de 
Guerre en Extrême-Orient, au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 7 mai 1946.
28 Awaya Kentaro, Tokyo Saiban he no michi [The road to the Tokyo Trials] (Tokyo: Kodansha Sensho Mechie, 2006), p. 69.
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lack sufficient documentation,” thus devoting himself to clearing France’s sullied name.29 In the dis-
cussions of the IPS, Oneto emphasized the pressure and violence that Japan inflicted on Indochina, as 
well as the French resistance to the Japanese, and claimed that Indochina had fought Japan and was a 
victim of Japanese invasion. As a result, the initial prosecution plan was changed to recognize Indochi-
na as a victim of Japanese invasion. It was decided to include the beginning and the continuation of 
the Japanese invasion of Indochina from September 1940 in the charges.
To procure the evidentiary documentation required to prove these actions, Oneto asked the French 
High Commissioner in Indochina to send all documentary evidence relating to the Japanese invasion 
of Indochina from 1940, including telegrams, reports, and treaties. Since mail and telegrams between 
Japan and Indochina were unreliable, Oneto himself eventually went to Indochina in May 1946 and 
gave instructions on collecting evidence. However, since many documents were lost or discarded 
during the Japanese coup de force, it was difficult to find appropriate evidence30 (There was obviously 
no shortage of documentation of the events of 1940, but the key issue was to demonstrate a maximum 
of coercion and force on the Japanese side and of resistance on the French side). Even so, in order to 
“protect France and Indochina from criticisms that they did not resist the Japanese invasion at all and 
were willingly attempting to co-operate with Japan,”31 he carefully selected evidence and prepared the 
proof.
To claim that Indochina was a complete victim of Japanese invasion, it was necessary to deny coexis-
tence with Japan from the occupation of northern Indochina in September 1940 to the Japanese take-
over of March 1945 and prove that Japan intended to invade Indochina from the outset. Although it 
was possible to sufficiently prove war crimes from the time of the coup, the French wished to make it 
clear that the Japanese invasion had not begun at that moment. It was for this reason that Oneto gath-
ered evidentiary documentation concerning the battle between Japanese and French forces that oc-
curred in September 1940 (the Lạng Sơn Affair). In this clash, before the conclusion of a treaty con-
cerning the occupation of northern Indochina, a unit of Japanese troops stationed on the Chinese 
frontier independently crossed the border and overwhelmed French forces. The battle ended up lasting 
only two days, with the Japanese government aiming for occupation through an agreement ordering 
the attacking unit to withdraw. This engagement was the only armed conflict between the French and 
Japanese before March 1945. The French prosecutor collected such items as leaflets distributed by the 
Japanese military directly after the Lạng Sơn Affair, stating, “if you resist us, the Japanese military will 
have to decisively punish you.”32 Lạng Sơn had been a repugnant incident for the colonial authorities 
that revealed the weakness of the French-Indochina forces and subsequently caused the French to lose 
the will to fight with Japan. After the war, however, it was presented as proof from the start of the Japa-
29 Document cited in note 28.
30 ANOM, AFFPOL 3438. Lettre du procureur français Robert Oneto, au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, 28 janvier 1947.
31 ANOM, INF 1272. Télégramme à l’arrivée, Saigon, de la part de Robert Oneto, procureur au Tribunal International de Tokyo, 
16 mai 1946.
32 MAE, Asie Océanie, Généralités 162. Documentation concernant les actes d’agression du Japon en Indochine, 25 mai 1946.
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France’s Attempts to Face its Past of its Partnership with the Japanese in the Control over Indochina with a Focus 
nese occupation in 1940 represented the first invasion.
Testimony began in court with the collection of documentation for evidence. Oneto emphasized 
that the Japanese attack on Indochina of September 22, 1940 was the “start of the Japanese military in-
vasion of French Indochina” and claimed that, having attempted to resist to the death without outside 
support, “France became the first victim of Japanese invasion among the Western nations.” He then 
went on to clarify the abuses carried out by the Japanese military, particularly from the time of the 
coup de force, by stating the repeated violations of French sovereignty and proving the preparation, 
planning, and start of the invasion of Indochina.33
The French prosecutor, who worked carefully to prepare the evidence, was aware that he should 
avoid mentioning the Indochinese independence movements in court. In a letter back to Paris, he 
wrote, “considering the current situation in Indochina, the recent independence declaration in the 
Philippines and the anti-colonial sentiment in America, we must not touch upon the support the Japa-
nese gave to the independence movement in Indochina. If we emphasize this, we will provide a pretext 
for a long debate for the defense team and for public opinion in parts of the Far East. At the current 
time this is quite inappropriate.”34
The counterargument of the defense was seen when Gabriel Lagues, a French witness, appeared in 
court to testify concerning Japanese atrocities in Indochina. In response to Lagues, a representative of 
the French Indochina War Crimes Investigation Committee (Commission de Recherche des Crimes de 
Guerre en Indochine), the defense had questions concerning the Gaullists in Indochina during the war. 
They questioned whether the French captured by the Japanese forces were Gaullists or Vichy support-
ers, as well as which side he himself was aligned with. As previously stated, France wanted to conceal 
the fact that many French in Indochina had supported the Vichy regime and that Gaullists had been 
largely inactive until after the Vichy government in France had fallen. In response to the defense coun-
sel’s questioning, Lagues could only evasively repeat that he did not know. Oneto could not tolerate 
this and countered that the defense’s questions were immaterial to the abuses committed by the Japa-
nese military, but the defense continued with its inquiry and the exchange went on.35
The French delegation reported the trial proceedings in detail back to France. Pechkoff, the French 
Ambassador to Japan, expressed recognition of the goal of restoring rights to the French nation 
through the trial, stating that
“Indochina was the first victim of a tripartite conspiracy in the Far East, and due to its 
weakness, isolation from the home country and abandonment by the Anglo-Saxon countries 
who were the only ones that could have extended assistance, Oneto proved that there was no 
other position to take and indisputably clarified the existence of France among the Allied na-
33 Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokkiroku [Shorthand notes of the Far East International Military Trials], vols. 79 to 84.
34 ANOM, INF 1364. Télégramme à l’arrivée, Tokyo, de la part de Robert Oneto, 22 septembre 1946.
35 Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokkiroku, vol. 153, pp. 18‒23, vol. 154, pp. 3‒6.
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tions fighting Japan as well as French rights concerning judgement and compensation.”36
The trial moved to the defense rebuttal stage after testimony by the prosecution. The point of dispute 
concerning French Indochina was whether the Japanese military occupation could be deemed a crime 
against peace, in other words, a war of invasion. The defense stated that the Japanese advance was 
based upon a bilateral agreement and was legal, and objected to its treatment as a crime against peace. 
The final decision of the court, however, did not recognize this argument. The main reason for this de-
cision was, as Oneto claimed, the Japanese government was deemed to have exerted military pressure 
by sending its forces from the northern Indochina border before the details of the agreement were im-
plemented.37
5.　Conclusion
After coexisting with Japan under the Vichy regime in Indochina during World War II, in the postwar 
period France needed to investigate and have an accounting of this period. An investigative committee 
questioned the French who were in Indochina and denounced the spreading of Pétainist ideology, 
co-operation with the Japanese, suppressing the Gaullists, and the inactivity of the resistance. Amidst 
attempts to clear these inconvenient truths and retake control of Indochina, by bringing Japan to justice 
for its attacks on French sovereignty in Indochina, the Japanese war crimes trials had significant political 
meaning. The importance of the trials investigating and trying war crimes committed by the Japanese 
was recognized in not just simply prosecuting these acts, but also in denying the reality of French co-
existence with Japan. Uncovering the atrocities of the Japanese and trying them as criminals in the Sai-
gon Trials ensured complete closure over the issue of Japanese control. It was also possible to empha-
size the existence of anti-Japanese activity by focusing judgment on the crackdown against French 
suspected of co-operating with Allied forces. Most of all, the French investigation and trial of Japanese 
war crimes in Indochina was also a symbol of the country’s control and authority over the colony.
At a broader level, French involvement in the Tokyo Trials, in which 11 nations jointly prosecuted 
A-class war criminals, can be seen in the context of a French return to the international community. 
While France managed to become a member of the Allies, it occupied a peculiar position after the war. 
Participating in the Tokyo Trials provided the opportunity to build a close relationship with other Al-
lied nations, as well as an international expression of its existence and voice. In these trials, France 
thoroughly disavowed co-operation with Japan, denounced Japanese atrocities, emphasized the resis-
tance in Indochina, and claimed they had not been collaborators with the Japanese but rather their 
first victim among Western nations. All these efforts took place within the context of the recoloniza-
tion of postwar Indochina.
36 ANOM, INF 1364. Lettre de Pechkoff, Ambassadeur de France, Chef de la Mission Française au Japon, au Ministre des Af-
faires Étrangères, 17 octobre 1946.
37 Toya Yuma, Tokyo Saiban [The Tokyo Trials] (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 2008), pp. 140‒41.
